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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v, 
RALPH LEROY MENZIES, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No, 880161 
Category No. 1 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of murder in the first 
degree, a capital felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
202 (1990), and aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1990). This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(i) (Supp. 1990) because the appeal is from a district court 
in a criminal case involving a capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Was the trial court correct when it determined that 
the court reporter at defendant's trial was de facto certified, 
or does the reporter's certification status preclude use of the 
transcript prepared by her for purposes of appeal? The court's 
legal conclusion of the reporter's status is based on factual 
findings made by the court; the legal conclusions are reviewed 
under a correction of error standard and the factual 
determinations are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard• 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); Oates v. Chavez, 
749 P.2d 658, 659 (Utah 1988)• 
2. Did the trial court correctly determine that, in 
spite of errors, the original transcript prepared in this matter 
was sufficiently accurate to afford defendant his appellate 
review? The same standard of review as that cited in issue 1 
applies to this issue as well. 
3. Will defendant be prejudiced by use of this 
transcript for his appeal? The trial court's conclusion that 
this transcript is adequate to afford defendant a fair and full 
appellate review is reviewed under the same standard as the first 
two issues. 
4. Does use of this transcript violate defendant's 
rights under the federal and the state constitutions? This issue 
was not presented to the court below and is reviewed under the 
plain error doctrine. State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019, 1026 and 
n.3 (Utah 1989) (citing State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 
(Utah 1989) ) . 
5. Is the issue of inclusion of a prosecutor's 
comments into the record after trial and sentencing properly 
before this Court, given that the State has stipulated to their 
removal from the record? There is no standard for reviewing this 
point. By stipulation, the comments are not part of the record 
and are not an issue for appellate review. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies are included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
After a trial by jury in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, 
district judge, presiding, defendant was convicted on March 8, 
1988, of criminal homicide, murder in the first degree, a capital 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1990), and 
aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony, in violation on 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1990) (Record [hereafter R.] at 844 
and 898-99). Defendant was sentenced to death on March 23, 1988, 
and the court signed an order to that effect on March 30, 1988 
(R. at 1098-1100). Defendant filed a notice of appeal on April 
22, 1988 (R. at 1108) . 
On November 15, 1989, defendant filed a motion to set 
aside the judgment, conviction and sentence, or, in the 
alternative, for a new trial. This motion was based on 
defendant's allegation that the transcript of his trial was 
inaccurate and that proper review of his trial could not be 
conducted using that transcript (R. at 1222-28). Several 
hearings were conducted regarding the transcript, and 
modifications of the records were proposed (R. at 1814-1929). On 
December 26, 1990, Judge Uno signed an order denying defendant's 
motion to set aside judgment and/or for a new trial. Judge Uno 
determined that the original transcript, "despite numerous 
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errors," was "sufficiently accurate to afford defendant a full 
and fair review of his issues to be raised on appeal." (R. at 
1192-93). Judge Uno ordered that the original transcript be 
certified to this Court for review of defendant's case. He also 
ordered that a copy of the transcript, "interlineated by 
defendant's counsel and containing [the reporter's] version of 
her . . . notes," be transmitted to this Court as part of the 
appellate record (R. at 1193). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A statement of the facts of the crime will not be given 
because the only issue before the Court in this brief is the 
sufficiency of the trial transcript to afford defendant a full 
and fair appellate review. 
In January 1988, Tauni Lee (formerly Byrd) was the 
sole applicant to fill a vacancy as court reporter for Judge Uno 
in the Third Judicial District Court (R. 11661 at 3 3 and 
Defendant's Exhibit [hereafter Def. Exh.] #3). Ms. Lee had 
attended school in California, graduating from a business college 
with a degree in court reporting (R. 1166 at 98). She sat for 
the California certified shorthand reporter examination in 1985, 
passed the test with 97 percent, and became 3icensed in that 
state as a certified shorthand reporter (CSR) (R. 1166 at 99-100 
1
 The transcripts of hearings held on the motion for new 
trial are paginated internally and have a sequential record 
number on the title page of each separate transcript. The 
transcripts involving the new trial and rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, hearings will be cited first to the record 
number of the transcript, then to the internal page within the 
transcript. 
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and State's Exhibit [hereafter St* Exh.] #31). The license was 
valid for five years; however, a yearly licensing fee was 
assessed to keep the license current (R. 1166 at 100). Ms. Lee's 
California license became delinquent in April 1987, when she 
failed to pay the yearly fee (Def. Exh. #2 and R. 1166 at 100). 
She did not pay the fee because she was moving to Utah and 
thought that she did not need to keep the California license 
current (R. 1166 at 100). 
When Ms. Lee came to Utah, she sought and received the 
registered professional reporter (RPR) certificate from the 
National Shorthand Reporters Association; it was her 
understanding that she needed this national certificate to work 
in Utah. This certificate was granted on the basis of her having 
passed the California CSR examination (R. 1166 at 101). She did 
not seek a Utah certificate because she did not know that she 
needed one; she thought that the national certificate was 
sufficient (R. 1166 at 16, 107 and 156-57). Ms. Lee reported 
defendant's trial in February and March of 1988 (R. 1166 at 108). 
The Court Administrator's Office was aware that Ms. Lee 
did not have a valid Utah CSR license; however, she was hired 
because she was the only applicant, she had been licensed in 
California, and Ronald Gibson, Deputy Court Administrator, 
determined that Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-17 allowed her to work 
until the next Utah test was given (R. 1166 at 82-83). 
Apparently, in May 1988, Mr. Gibson became concerned at 
representations being made by Ms. Lee about the length of time 
-5-
she was going to need to complete the transcript of defendant's 
trial (Def. Exh. # 6). Mr. Gibson also learned that Ms. Lee was 
experiencing problems with California courts because she was 
delinquent in forwarding transcripts of California cases she had 
reported before coming to Utah (Def. Exh. #9). 
Mr. Gibson expressed his concerns to Ms. Lee and she 
informed him that she was using a note reader to assist in 
preparation of the transcript; this procedure was slow because 
the note reader could only work every other week. Mr. Gibson and 
Ms. Lee agreed that she would be placed on leave-with-pay status 
on the weeks opposite those during which the note reader was 
preparing the transcript; this would allow the transcript to be 
completed by July 1988 (Memo of May 17, 1988 in Def. Exh. #3 
[also found as Def. Exh. #6] and R. 1166 at 67-70). This Court 
extended the date by which Ms. Lee was ordered to complete this 
transcript to September 6, 1988, and, to that end, Ms. Lee was 
relieved of her in-court duties on August 29, 1988 (Def. Exh. #13 
and 14 and R. 1166 at 75-76). Ms. Lee completed the transcript 
by September 6, 1988 and her employment with the Third District 
Court was terminated on September 7, 1988. The reasons given for 
the termination were habitual tardiness and absenteeism, a 
security breach problem, and slow preparation of transcripts (R. 
1166 at 78-79 and Def. Exh. 16). The termination did not relate 
specifically to defendant's case; Mr. Gibson never received any 
complaints regarding the accuracy or quality of her work (R. 1166 
at 80). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Ms. Lee's licensing status does not preclude the use of 
the transcript of defendant's trial. While Ms. Lee did not apply 
for and obtain a Utah license so that she could legally use the 
appellation "Certified Shorthand Reporter" in Utah, she had been 
trained and was licensed in California and nationally as a 
certified shorthand reporter. The Court Reporters and 
Stenographers Act and the Code of Judicial Administration provide 
for appointment of qualified reporters to act as official court 
reporters in certain circumstances, even if they do not have a 
Utah CSR license. The trial court correctly determined that Ms. 
Lee was qualified, although not licensed in Utah, to report 
defendant's trial. 
It is defendant's burden to demonstrate that this 
transcript is inadequate for review and cannot be corrected by 
use of the procedures in rule 11, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. The trial court did not err in determining that the 
transcript, while it did contain errors, was adequate for 
appellate review. None of the errors cited by defendant are 
significant, nor are they incapable of being corrected by reading 
them in context. Because the transcript is adequate for 
appellate review, defendant will not be prejudiced by its use. 
The federal constitution does not require a perfect 
transcript; it requires a transcript of sufficient completeness 
to allow for proper consideration of defendant's claims. This 
constitutional requirement is met by this transcript. Defendant 
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has not analyzed a different standard under the state 
constitution for reviewing the sufficiency of this transcript; 
consequently, this Court should decline to conduct a separate 
state constitutional analysis. 
A prosecutor's comments which were added to the record 
two months after defendant's sentencing has been removed from the 
record by stipulation and is not a ground for appellate review, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH STATUTES DO NOT PRECLUDE THE USE OF THIS 
TRANSCRIPT. 
Defendant first claims that Utah statutes preclude the 
use of this transcript; specifically, he cites the Court 
Reporters and Stenographers Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-1.1 et 
seq., and Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206(2). Analysis of this point 
involves the interplay of several statutes and rules. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-206(2) (1990), cited by defendant, mandates an 
automatic review of his conviction and sentence "within 60 days 
after certification by the sentencing court of the entire record 
unless time is extended[.]" This statute does not address what 
constitutes an adequate record for purposes of appellate review. 
Other statutes and rules delineate the qualifications 
and duties of court reporters. The provisions do not specify 
what should occur when a transcript is challenged as insufficient 
for appellate review; however, they do establish a framework for 
understanding the appointment of a court reporter and establish 
an evidentiary burden on the party challenging the adequacy of 
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the record. Rule 80, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1991) 
(repealed May 1, 1991), provided, in pertinent part: 
(a) Appointment of reporters. The judges 
of the district courts may appoint reporters 
to report the proceedings of the court. 
(b) Duties. It shall be the duty of the 
reporter to attend all sessions of the court, 
and to record in full the evidence given and 
all proceedings had therein, including 
proceedings at any pretrial, except when the 
judge dispenses with his[/her] services in a 
particular cause or with respect to a portion 
of the proceedings thereof. The reporter 
shall file with the clerk forthwith the 
original record required to be taken at a 
trial or hearing, and, when requested so to 
do, shall with reasonable diligence furnish 
any party a transcript of the record of the 
evidence and proceedings, or any part 
thereof, upon payment of the fees required by 
law. Any transcript of the evidence of 
proceedings shall be made in accordance with 
the requirements of Subdivision (d) of Rule 
10, relating to the type of paper, kind of 
type, and margins of pleadings and other 
papers filed with the clerk. 
This rule was repealed recently, perhaps because its language and 
purpose overlap with provisions of the Court Reporters and 
Stenographers Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-1.1 et seq. (1987 and 
Supp. 1990). 
Certain provisions of that act, read together, 
demonstrate that Ms. Lee's licensing status is not the 
determining factor in deciding whether this transcript may be 
used for appellate review. The act distinguishes between a 
shorthand reporter and a certified shorthand reporter. A 
shorthand reporter is 
defined to mean any person who is engaged in 
the practice of making by use of symbols or 
abbreviations a verbatim record of any trial, 
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proceeding, or hearing before any district 
court . . . of this state. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-14 (1987). To use the appellation 
"shorthand reporter," one need not be certified by any state or 
licensing authority, one need only be engaged in the practice of 
using symbols to make a verbatim record of any court proceeding. 
The duties of the shorthand reporter are listed in the act: 
The shorthand reporter shall attend all 
sessions of the court, and take full 
stenographic notes of the evidence given and 
of all proceedings of each session, except 
when the judge dispenses with his[/her] 
services in a particular cause or for a 
portion of the proceedings. The reporter 
shall file with the clerk forthwith the 
original stenographic notes required to be 
taken at a trial or hearing, and, when 
requested, shall with reasonable diligence 
furnish the defendant in a criminal cause, . 
. . a transcript of the stenographic notes of 
the evidence and proceedings, or any part of 
it, upon payment of the fees as provided. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-2 (1987). 
The act establishes a presumption that certain 
transcripts are correct. Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-6 (1987) states 
that "[a] transcript of a reporter's notes, written in longhand 
or typewritten, certified by him[/her] as being a correct 
transcript of evidence and proceedings, is prima facie a correct 
statement of such evidence and proceedings." (Emphasis added). 
A reporter is not required by this statute or Utah Code Ann. § 
78-56-14 (defining "shorthand reporter") to be certified by any 
state or licensing authority before he or she may certify a 
transcript as correct under this section. 
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The act does require a different eligibility standard 
for regular district court reporters. The statute regarding 
appointment of reporters in a district court reads: 
No person may be appointed to the position 
of shorthand reporter nor act in that 
capacity in any district court . . . of this 
state, . . . unless he[/she] has received a 
certificate from the Division of Occupational 
and Professional Licensing as provided in 
this chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-15 (1987). The granting of a certificate 
is an administrative matter controlled by Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-
16 (1987), which states: 
Any citizen of the United States at least 
18 years of age, of good moral character, who 
possesses a high degree of skill and ability 
in the art of shorthand reporting, and who 
passes a satisfactory examination as provided 
in this chapter, is entitled to a certificate 
and shall be known as a certified shorthand 
reporter. 
If a reporter meets these qualifications, he or she is entitled 
to the certificate and to be known as a certified shorthand 
reporter. If the qualifications are met, the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing does not appear to have 
any discretion about granting the certificate. 
The statutes cited thus far establish that a regular 
district court reporter must normally be Utah certified; however, 
provision has been made for emergency situations when a Utah 
certified reporter is not available. Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-17 
(1987) allows the appointment of temporary substitutes in the 
place of regularly appointed court reporters. That statute 
reads: 
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If any regularly appointed certified 
shorthand reporter is disabled from 
performing his[/her] duty or is removed from 
his[/her] position, the judge of the court in 
which that certified shorthand reporter has 
been appointed may appoint any substitute 
he[/she] deems competent to act during the 
temporary disability of the regular reporter 
and until his [/her] successor is appointed. 
The temporary appointment shall continue only 
until the next regular examination for 
certified shorthand reporters held by the 
Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing. 
The act provides criminal penalties for violation of any of its 
provisions, Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-19 (1987); the act does not 
state or imply that a transcript prepared in violation of the act 
cannot be used for appellate review. 
In conjunction with the Court Reporters and 
Stenographers Act, rule 3-304, Code of Judicial Administration 
(1991), establishes "uniform administrative policies governing 
the appointment . . . of official court reporters serving in the 
various district courts of the state." The rule provides the 
standards of qualification for serving as an official court 
reporter; i.e., that the reporter be licensed by the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing. However, the rule also 
states that "the state court administrator may authorize 
exceptions to this required qualification in the event that 
certified shorthand reporters are not available or an official 
court reporter or a graduate of an accredited court reporting 
school is deemed competent, but is not licensed for reasons 
unrelated to satisfactory performance as an official court 
reporter[.]" Rule 3-304 (2) (A), Code of Judicial Administration. 
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George Weiler of the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing testified that they had no record that Ms. 
Lee had ever applied for or received a license from the state of 
Utah to be a CSR (R. 1166 at 7-9). Ms. Lee never claimed that 
she had received a separate Utah CSR license; she obtained a 
national RPR designation on the basis of having passed the CSR 
examination in California (R. 1166 at 101 and 107). During 1987, 
a person received a Utah CSR if she applied and took the Utah 
exam or had a current license from another state (R. 1166 at 9-
10). Utah exams were given in June and December of 1987 (R. 1166 
at 10). According to Mr. Weiler, the division recognized that 
the court administrator's office had "a separate set of rules," 
whereby they were allowed to use qualified people on a temporary 
basis without a Utah license (R. 1166 at 11). 
After hearing the evidence and argument regarding Ms. 
Lee's licensing status, Judge Uno concluded that "although she 
was not [Utah] licensed as a court reporter, she was qualified to 
report this trial" (R. 1186 at 5 [hearing held July 6, 1990]). 
This conclusion is supported by the evidence and should be 
upheld. 
Ms. Lee was the sole applicant for the position in 
Judge Uno's courtroom (R. 1166 at 82). She had passed the 
California examination and had received the CSR designation in 
that state; she had also worked for courts in California (R. 1166 
at 100-104). Based on this information, which apparently was 
known to Judge Uno, he was entitled to appoint Ms. Lee to serve 
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as his courtroom reporter under Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-17; her 
appointment was also appropriate under rule 3-304, Code of 
Judicial Administration. This appointment was valid "until the 
next regular examination" held by the licensing division. 
Defendant's trial was held during the time that Ms. Lee was 
authorized to act as Judge Uno's reporter. 
Ms. Lee's licensing status did not preclude her acting 
as reporter for Judge Uno; neither does it invalidate the 
transcript which was prepared in this case. Indeed, the 
transcript is presumed correct unless proven otherwise. 
Consequently, defendant's argument that Utah law precludes use of 
the transcript prepared by Ms. Lee is without merit. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
TRANSCRIPT PREPARED IN THIS MATTER IS 
ADEQUATE TO PROVIDE DEFENDANT WITH APPELLATE 
REVIEW. 
Defendant's second claim of error is that appellate 
review of his case is impossible because of inaccuracies in the 
transcript. 
A. Defendant has the Burden of Establishing that the 
Transcript is Inadequate for Appellate Review. 
Defendant contends that the state must establish the 
accuracy of the transcript of his trial in order for the 
transcript to be used in reviewing his conviction. The rules of 
appellate procedure and case law demonstrate that it is the 
appellant's burden to show that the appellate record is 
insufficient and that the insufficiency cannot be rectified by 
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procedures mandated by the rules of appellate procedure. Rule 
11(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, dictates that the 
appellant "shall comply with the provisions of paragraphs (d) and 
(e) of this rule and shall take any other action necessary to 
enable the clerk of the trial court to assemble and transmit the 
record." Rule 11 provides a means by which the record may be 
corrected or modified, including the means by which the record 
may be settled if the parties will not stipulate to a corrected 
record. Rule 11(h), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The 
advisory committee note to this provision states: 
This paragraph applies whenever there is a 
question as to whether the transcript or the 
original papers accurately reflect what 
occurred in the district court. These 
disputes should usually be submitted to the 
district court since it will ordinarily be in 
the best position to ascertain the 
correctness of the record. 
(quoted in State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah 1990)). 
In this matter, defendant's trial was reported and 
transcribed. In the arguably more serious circumstance of lost 
reporter's notes and unreported proceedings, this Court has 
directed recourse to rule 11(h) proceedings to settle the record. 
Even in that context, this Court has required the appellant to 
show that the procedures provided by this rule for reconstructing 
and settling the record are inadequate. See Emig v. Hayward, 703 
P.2d 1043, 1048-49 (Utah 1985); see also State v. Perry, 136 
Wis.2d 92, 401 N.W.2d 748, 752 (1987). The burden was and is on 
defendant to show the district court and this Court that the 
-15-
provisions of rule 11(h) were inadequate to provide a sufficient 
record for review by this Court. 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Determined that this 
Record is Adequate for Appellate Review. 
Defendant next presents a litany of "failings" by the 
court reporter in an attempt to show that the transcript is 
inadequate for review. The state has never claimed that the 
transcript is without flaw; neither did the trial judge so find. 
Just as no defendant is guaranteed a perfect trial, no defendant 
is guaranteed a perfect transcript. People v. Feigin, 174 Cal. 
App.2d 553, 345 P.2d 273, 281 (Cal. App. 1959). This may be the 
basis for including a provision for correcting a record in the 
rules of appellate procedure. The United States Supreme Court, 
in the context of the duty of the state toward indigent 
defendants, held that the state must provide an indigent with the 
same adequate and effective review as that given a defendant with 
funds. The Court stated: 
In terms of a trial record, this means that 
the State must afford the indigent a "'record 
of sufficient completeness' to permit proper 
consideration of [his] claims." [Draper v. 
Washington, 372 U.S. 487,] 499 . . .(quoting 
Coppedge v. United States [sic], 369 U.S. 
438, 446 .. . (1962))-
A "record of sufficient completeness" does 
not translate automatically into a complete 
verbatim transcript. . . . We considered 
this more fully in Draper v. Washington 
[sic], supra, 372 U.S., at 495-496: 
"Alternative methods of reporting trial 
proceedings are permissible if they place 
before the appellate court an equivalent 
report of the events at trial from which 
the appellant's contentions arise." 
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Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194 (1971). The constitutional 
requirement is a record sufficient to permit appellate review, 
not a perfect record. 
In State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983), this 
Court found that inaudible responses by a prospective juror on 
voir dire could not be reconstructed because of "significant gaps 
in the transcript." .Id. at 447 n.3. Given the responses which 
were capable of being transcribed, in conjunction with a 
reluctance to assume what the inaudible answers were, this Court 
found the record in that case to be inadequate and a new trial 
was appropriate. In a case somewhat similar to the present case, 
the Utah Court of Appeals distinguished Taylor. The court of 
appeals addressed a situation in which the court reporter had 
left the state and another reporter had prepared the transcript, 
using the written notes of the absent reporter. In State v. 
Jonas, 793 P.2d 902 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 
(1990), the court of appeals stated that the court reporter's 
transcripts were "virtually complete and thus amply adequate for 
[the court] to review defendant's claims." Ld. at 910. The 
court found the transcript to be "functionally adequate for 
review. Not all deficiencies or inaccuracies in the record 
require a new trial." Jd. (citing State v. Perry, 136 Wis.2d 92, 
401 N.W.2d 748, 752 (1987). In Perry, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court stated: 
It is equally clear that not all 
deficiencies in the record nor all 
inaccuracies require a new trial. An 
inconsequential omission or a slight 
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inaccuracy in the record which would not 
materially affect appellate counsel's 
preparation of the appeal or which would not 
contribute to an appellate court's improper 
determination of an appeal do not rise to 
such magnitude as to require ipso facto 
reversal. Error in transcript preparation or 
production, like error in trial procedures, is 
subject to the harmless-error rule. 
401 N.W.2d at 752. 
This Court has allowed a trial court to ireconstruct a 
record, even without the stipulation of the parties, in a 
circumstance in which no record was ever made. In State v. 
Moosman, 794 P.2d 474 (Utah 1990), a capital homicide case, this 
Court remanded the matter to the district court to.supplement the 
record with record of a proceeding which had not been reported. 
Quoting an earlier decision, this Court said: 
[WJe deem it safe and proper to assume that 
proceedings have been carried on in 
conformity with the law. Accordingly, when 
there is no transcript as to what happened, 
we indulge that presumption; and in the 
absence of persuasive proof, the trial 
court as the finder of the facts is not 
obliged to find to the contrary. 
If it appears that there is any reasonable 
likelihood that there was some substantial 
failure to accord the accused the 
protections our law affords, or that there 
may have been a miscarriage of justice 
. . . then the best possible effort should 
be made to reconstruct the record and 
ascertain just what occurred. This 
determination is to be made by the trial 
court subject to the usual rules of 
procedure, and review by this court. 
Id. at 478 (quoting Whetton v. Turner, 28 Utah 2d 47, 49-50, 497 
P.2d 856, 858 (1972) (citations omitted)); see also 57 A.L.R.4th 
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1061; People v. Chessman, 35 Cal.2d 455, 218 P.2d 769, 773, cert. 
denied, 340 U.S. 840 (1950) (no unfairness in placing burden on 
appellant of showing either prejudicial error or that the record 
so inadequate that he is unable to show error); People v. 
Chessman, 52 Cal.2d 467, 341 P.2d 679, 690-92, cert, denied, 361 
U.S. 925 (1959) (changes after reconstruction of the record were 
numerous but they did not change the substance and nature of the 
case; transcript substantially accurate and sufficiently 
complete). In the present case, a transcript was prepared. 
While errors may be present in the transcript, they are either 
insignificant or were capable of being corrected by application 
of the procedures of rule 11(h). Such correction could have been 
accomplished by the proposed modifications of the record at the 
trial court; however, these proposed modifications were not 
always accepted by defendant. 
While appeal in this matter was originally pending 
before this Court, defendant filed a motion to set aside judgment 
and/or for a new trial on November 15, 1989 in the Third District 
Court (R. at 1222-28). A memorandum and affidavits in support of 
the motion were also filed (R. at 1229-1444). An affidavit by 
defendant's counsel listed a number of "discrepancies" and gave 
examples of material which counsel felt was erroneous (R. at 
1256-62). The Third District Court determined that it did not 
have jurisdiction and sent the matter to this Court (R. at 1466 
and 1498-99). Several documents were filed in this Court, 
including record modifications proposed by defendant (Def. Exh. 
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#33). In response to the proposed modifications, the State 
stipulated to striking comments made by the prosecutor found at 
R. 3273-75, agreeing that the comments were placed on the record 
at a time when court was not in session and was done outside of 
the presence of the court and of the jury (Def. Exh. #33). The 
State also stipulated to the other word changes proposed by 
defendant (Def. Exh. #33 and R. 1935 at 43-46). This Court 
subsequently remanded this matter to the trial court to settle 
the record (R. at 1541). 
During the evidentiary hearings conducted by the trial 
court, defendant continued to argue that the transcript could not 
be corrected (R. at 1572-1606 and R. 1166 and 1185 [transcripts 
of hearings conducted March 9 and 23, 1990]). The State pointed 
out that it had stipulated to the requested word changes in the 
transcripts, although only one of the changes appeared to be of 
any significance (R. at 1663-64). The court continued to conduct 
hearings, asking the parties to "go over" the record and 
determine what errors existed and tell the court why the errors 
were consequential (R. at 1935-36 and 1186-90 [transcripts of 
hearings conducted June 4, July 6, September 17, September 24, 
and October 22, 1990]). At the June 4 hearing, the court stated 
that, of the errors pointed out to that date, he found none to be 
of consequence (R. 1936 at 16). At the October 22, 1990, 
hearing, the State represented that one of the prosecutors, 
Richard MacDougall, had read the transcripts and had not found 
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the transcripts to be as deficient as defense counsel had 
indicated (R. 1190 at 5). 
On November 7, 1990, Judge Uno conducted a hearing on 
the status of the case. At that time, Judge Uno said: 
I have read through all the transcripts. And 
based on my reading through the transcripts 
and the errors I've seen, I could find 
nothing in there that I think five Supreme 
Court justices and their law clerks couldn't 
correct if they're real substantial errors 
[sic]. 
So I thought that we could do [sic], is if 
there are errors that you think are 
substantial that need for the attorneys to 
get together with the court, that we'll just 
confine it to just those. Because most of 
the transcript, I didn't have any trouble 
with whatsoever, and the errors that were 
errors were quite glaring. You look at it 
and you know it's a mistake, a spelling, 
typo, punctuation, some kind of grammar, name 
[sic]. 
But as far as the text itself is 
concerned, there was nothing in there that I 
could not understand. So there may be 
something that you people may have detected 
that I might have gone over, but I've read 
through the whole transcript, and there are a 
lot of errors in there, different types, but 
nothing that I felt was prejudicial. 
(R. 1191 at 3). The court was prepared to certify the transcript 
as correct to this Court at that point (R. 1191 at 9-11). In 
spite of those statements by the court, the court allowed Ms. Lee 
to continue to proofread the transcript under the scrutiny of 
agents for both parties (R. 1191 at 8-10). 
On November 30, 1990, the State proposed modifications 
in the record; there is no indication in the record of a response 
by defendant (R. at 1788-89). On December 3, 1990, the court 
conducted another hearing at which defense counsel testified 
-21-
about the corrections and changes in the transcript which arose 
as Ms. Lee proofread it (R. 1931 [transcript of hearing conducted 
December 3, 1990]). At the conclusion of the evidence and 
arguments, the court again asked counsel to indicate what 
significant errors remained and try to reach an agreement 
regarding those errors (R. 1931 at 249). If counsel could not 
agree, the court would then look at the specific areas indicated 
and would determine if the record could be corrected (R. 1931 at 
248). The State offered to submit a list of proposed changes; 
defendant argued that a correct record could not be formulated 
and asked the court to grant the new trial (R. 1931 at 249-51). 
After reviewing the matter further, the trial court concluded 
that the errors pointed out by counsel were correctable if 
counsel would assist (R. 1931 at 261). The court had a concern 
with only a few of the denoted errors; otherwise, he was again 
prepared to certify the transcript at that point (R. 1931 at 
264). 
Defendant filed a second proposal of modifications on 
December 17, 1990 (R. at 1818-1908). On December 19, 1990, the 
State filed a proposal of modifications (R. at 1915-28). 
Defendant responded by stipulating to some of the State's 
modifications and pointing out other concerns (R. at 1909-14). 
At a final hearing on December 19, 1990, the parties indicated 
some stipulated changes (R. 1932 at 5). After a further attempt 
to settle the record word for word, the parties stipulated that 
the original transcript and the "California" transcript would be 
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certified to this Court for review of the transcript issue (R. 
1932 at 78). 
Defendant has failed throughout these proceedings to 
point out any significant uncorrectable errors in the transcript 
which make it impossible for this Court to review his conviction. 
All of his allegations either do not point out any error or point 
to insignificant mistakes which do not change the sense of the 
transcript. 
He first alleges that the reporter stopped reporting 
questions and admonitions during voir dire and that the note 
reader created portions of the voir dire (Brief of"Appellant 
[hereafter Br. of App.] at 23-29). He apparently bases this 
claim on the fact that Ms. Lee used asterisks to signify when 
certain repetitive questions were asked or admonitions given. 
Shorthand reporting is the "use of symbols or abbreviations" to 
record legal proceedings. Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-14 (1987). Ms. 
Lee used asterisks to denote certain questions and admonitions 
which were repeated by the court (R. 1931 at 31-32). Defense 
counsel admits that she prepared a "script" for the court to use, 
and that counsel agreed that the reporter would not have to make 
notes for the repetitive script that the court used on voir dire 
(R. 1931 at 30). It is apparent from the trial record, and 
counsel admits, that the court went through the same questions 
with each prospective juror (Transcript of trial2 [hereafter 
2
 References to the trial transcript are to the "California" 
version. Recourse to the interlineated transcript is helpful to 
understand defendant's allegations. 
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Tr.] at 178, 243, 260, 271, 322 and 330 and R. 1931 at 33). 
Instead of preparing word for word notations of the repeated 
questions, Ms. Lee may have merely used the asterisk symbol to 
indicate that the question was being repeated for each juror. 
That use of symbols to indicate a repeated question which then 
could be transcribed verbatim when the record was prepared is no 
different than the use of symbols for the individual words or 
sounds. The same purpose is accomplished; the question, as asked 
by the court, is placed in the notes to be transcribed at a later 
time. 
Defendant next contends that questi ons and juror 
responses "do not make sense," and he infers that the reporter 
did not report the questions correctly (Br. of App> at 24). The 
transcript citations given do not bear out this conclusion. Some 
of the responses by prospective jurors may have been less than 
articulate but that does not support the conclusion that the 
reporter erred. People are not always totally articulate when 
answering questions in front of a group. The responses did not 
appear to confuse the court or counsel in most cases; the 
questioning continued. The response on page 215 cited by 
defendant did trigger further discussion betvzeen counsel and the 
court at page 268. Counsel sought clarification of that response 
(Tr. at 268). Defendant has not told this Court how these 
responses have prejudiced his ability to appeal his conviction. 
The same is true of his claim that the reporter denoted 
by asterisks the court's admonishment not to discuss the case. 
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Defendant does not claim that the jury was not admonished or that 
they did not abide by the admonishment. Consequently, how the 
admonishment was recorded is not significant to defendant's 
appeal. 
Defendant has also not shown why the fact that the note 
reader had copies of the police report, the trial judge's notes, 
and the autopsy report is significant (Br. of App. at 28). The 
citation to a description of a person supposedly taken from a 
police report is citation to a proffer by defense counsel out of 
the presence of the jury (Tr. at 2238). The proffer was of 
hearsay testimony of a person who was deceased and, based on the 
proffer, the court allowed a detective to testify to the hearsay 
(Tr. at 2243-44). Defendant has not shown that possible error in 
reporting counsel's proffer is significant to an appellate issue. 
The testimony defendant sought to admit by use of the proffer was 
admitted. A review of the next citation given by defendant does 
not show that there was any correction by the reporter; the 
testimony indicates that the witness cannot explain an eleven-
month discrepancy between two occurrences (Tr. at 2264-66). The 
final citation in this paragraph is to the transcript of the 
judge reciting from the notes he had taken of defendant's 
circumstances as part of the court's judgment (Tr. at 3248-61). 
Defendant does not demonstrate any error on the page cited which 
impacts his appellate review (Tr. at 3261). 
Defendant lists "other examples" of transcript which 
the note reader supposedly "made up" (Br. of App. at 28). The 
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majority of the citations are to pages in which the court 
admonished prospective jurors not to discuss the case and the 
transcript indicates one juror leaving and another entering the 
room for individual voir dire. The reporter indicated these 
occurrences by use of asterisks which the note reader then 
interpreted and filled in with the words appropriate to what was 
occurring at the time. The note reader did not "make up" 
occurrences in the court. Of the other pages cited, some have no 
indication that there is error; others demonstrate, in the 
"California" version, that Ms. Lee read some of the symbols 
differently than the note reader had. The State sought to 
stipulate to a correct reading of some of these "errors," but 
defendant declined to do so (R. at 1909-28). All of the examples 
cited by defendant can be understood in context and are either 
insignificant or easily correctable. 
Some of the examples cited by defendant are contained 
in the argument of counsel at trial. During the hearings on the 
transcript issue, defendant called these significant because of 
the doctrine of waiver; i.e., they argued that they would be 
barred if a faulty transcript did not preserve their arguments, 
thus failing to preserve an issue for appeal (R. 1931 at 79). In 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987), this Court reiterated 
a "death penalty exception to the contemporaneous objection 
rule." JEd.. at 552 (footnote omitted). In death penalty cases, 
this Court will address arguments raised for the first time on 
appeal; consequently, defendant's argument that errors in the 
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transcript may waive his right to appeal an issue is without 
merit. In any event, the supposed errors in reporting counsel's 
arguments are so minor that they do not preclude this Court from 
recognizing the issues argued and preserved below. 
Defendant argues that portions of the transcript are 
"unintelligible" (Br. of App. at 33). He specifically cites to 
instances of argument by counsel and testimony by witness 
Britton. A reading of each of the citations given in his brief 
demonstrates that the arguments about Britton's testimony and 
about introduction of defendant's prison record are extensive 
enough that, even with minor errors in a particular sentence, the 
argument counsel made is clear. Even if this Court did apply the 
doctrine of waiver in death penalty cases, the arguments of 
counsel are so extensive that the grounds upon which the 
arguments are based are clear in the transcript. The testimony 
of Britton may not be articulate; however, the State offered to 
stipulate to correct any errors. The context of the statements 
make the correct reading clear and also demonstrate that the 
errors are insignificant to defendant's appellate issue on the 
use of Britton's preliminary hearing testimony. Any errors in 
Britton's testimony, even if they were significant, could be 
corrected. The same is true of defendant's argument regarding 
admission of defendant's prison record. 
The citations given by defendant in reference to his 
challenges to jurors for cause simply do not support his 
allegation that the questions and answers were unintelligible 
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(Br. of App. at 33). The transcript at the record citations 
present a clear view of the jurors's answers. Defendant's 
argument appears to go more to the fact that the court asked 
rehabilitating questions to clarify each prospective juror's 
answers. If the questions appeared to confuse the juror or the 
juror gave conflicting answers, such is not the fault of the 
reporter or the transcript. Again, defendant charges that the 
note reader made up voir dire answers for the jurors. There is 
nothing in the record to support that allegation. The only 
material arguably not in the reporter's original notes at the 
citation given by defendant is the court's admonition not to 
discuss the case. The presence of the admonition is indicated by 
asterisks; there is no indication that the note reader fabricated 
voir dire answers (Tr. at 751-52). 
The catchall paragraphs regarding other unintelligible 
portions of the transcript found on page 34 of defendant's brief 
have no merit for the reasons already given. The citations are 
to opening statement, argument of counsel, testimony outside the 
presence of the jury of a "shakedown" of defendant's cell during 
trial, or to other matters which are not significant for 
defendant's appellate review. 
Defendant challenges number and name discrepancies 
between the original transcript and the "California" version (Br. 
of App. at 35). Unless names are spelled for the reporter, 
-28-
mistakes in spelling may occur.3 Unless the spelling of a name 
is significant to the appeal, a discrepancy in a name is not 
grounds for a new trial. As to the number issue, one citation 
given by defendant does not exist in the record (3656). The 
majority of the citations are to numbers which have no 
significance for appellate review, such as whether the court 
called a ten or a fifteen minute recess (Tr. at 887), or the page 
number of a case cited to the court in argument by counsel (Tr. 
at 1920 and 2704). All of the numbers given in testimony can be 
read correctly in the context of the testimony where they are 
found. The State sought to stipulate to the logical readings of 
testimony such as IQ percentiles during the penalty phase, and 
such words as "archive" and "Rorschach test," but defendant 
declined to stipulate (Tr. at 2040, 3035 and 3061). The dates 
and times of certain occurrences can be reconstructed from the 
context of the testimony and from documentary evidence which was 
stipulated to at trial (Tr. at 1604 and 1888). Defendant 
declined to use these means to reconcile discrepancies in the 
record (R. 1931 at 159). 
3
 Even the transcripts of the hearings conducted in 1990 on 
the transcript issues bear this point out. One reporter spelled 
the first name of defense counsel "Brook" and another spelled it 
"Brooke." (R. 1188 and 1932 at the "Appearances" pages). As 
significant as the spelling of ones name is to a person, if there 
is no confusion about the person referred to, a misspelling is not 
significant for appellate review. Defendant has not alleged that 
any misspelled name is grounds for appeal. 
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None of the other issues raised by defendant in Point 
II B of his brief raise any claim that material of significance 
was left out of the trial transcripts, 
C. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206 Does Not Require a 
Perfect Transcript for Appellate Review. 
Defendant next argues that Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206(2) 
requires a verbatim accurate transcript for appellate review. 
However, this statute simply establishes an event, receipt of the 
entire record, from which the time for review begins to run. It 
does not define what is considered to be the record on appeal. 
As argued above, the requirement is for an adequate record, a 
record of sufficient completeness to allow proper consideration 
of defendant's claims. " A 'record of sufficient completeness' 
does not translate automatically into a complete verbatim 
transcript. . . . 'Alternative methods of reporting trial 
proceedings are permissible if they place before the appellate 
court an equivalent report of the events at trial from which the 
appellant's contentions arise.'" Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 
194 (1971) (quoting Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S., at 495-496). 
The record provided in this case was determined to be adequate to 
provide defendant appellate review and defendant has not shown 
that this conclusion by the trial court is incorrect. Since the 
transcript has been determined to be accurate enough for review, 
the statutory provision relating to mandatory review has not been 
violated. 
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POINT III 
BECAUSE THIS TRANSCRIPT IS ADEQUATE FOR 
REVIEW, DEFENDANT IS NOT PREJUDICED BY USE OF 
IT. 
Defendant argues that he will be prejudiced by the use 
of either the original or the "California" transcript and 
reiterates the arguments made in Point II. The voir dire issue 
has been shown to be without substance and will not be addressed 
again in this point. 
Defendant points to specific numbers in the transcript 
to argue that their "unreliability" prejudices him. Early in the 
transcript, the parties argued the availability of witness 
Britton because the State was seeking to admit Britton's 
preliminary hearing testimony through use of a transcript (Tr. at 
12-23). Defendant claims that it is impossible to determine the 
rule of evidence which was being argued because there is one 
reference to a rule "45" in the transcript (Tr. at 15). The 
previous transcript page clearly states that the motion is 
pursuant to rule 804, Utah Rules of Evidence, a rule which 
provides exceptions to the hearsay rule (Tr. at 14). Ms. 
Palacios enumerates the subsections of rule 804(a)* on page 14 
and 15. A reference to "45" is immediately followed by a 
statement of the text of subsection (5) of rule 804(a) (Tr. at 
* On page 14, reference is made to a rule "804.82" which, in 
context, obviously refers to 804(a)(2). The similarity in sound 
between "8" and "a" when spoken possibly explains the discrepancy. 
In any case, Ms. Palacios read the text of 804(a)(2) after the 
reference to "804.82" and the correct reading of the number is 
clear. 
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15). This explanation was given by Mr. MacDougall at the hearing 
to settle the transcript but was rejected by defense counsel (R. 
1932 at 49-52). The context of the argument clearly informs this 
Court of the argument which was being raised such that, even if 
this Court did apply waiver, the issue was obviously preserved. 
The confusion about the year in which Nicole Arnold 
delivered a social security card to the police is a function of 
the testimony itself, not the transcription. Witness Duffy's 
original testimony was that the card was found in December of 
1986 (Tr. at 1508). On cross-examination, he gave the year as 
1987 (Tr. at 1514). The rest of the testimony by Duffy and by 
witness Franks show confusion about the year of the occurrence 
(Tr. at 1506-18). That confusion may be the basis for an 
appellate issue (although testimony from the police agency 
regarding the day it was turned over to them, which was the same 
day it was found, may clarify the date), but the confusion came 
from the witnesses themselves, not from the reporter. An actual 
discrepancy in the years which may be attributable to the 
reporter can be clarified by the context of the dates given on 
pages 1514-15. Reference is made to "sometime in 1986 [1987], 
being several months ago, or was it given to you in 1987 [1986], 
up to a year and some months ago?" (Tr. at 1514-15). From the 
internal context of that question, the correct order of the years 
can be determined. 
The testimony of dates relating to witness Britton's 
federal sentencing is also clarified by looking at the dates in 
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the context of the rest of the testimony. Page 2011 is not 
testimony, but a statement by counsel of a contact between 
Britton's attorney and the State which occurred after the 
preliminary hearing (Tr. at 2011). Page 2038 refers to a contact 
prior to the preliminary hearing during which Britton's attorney 
noted that the prosecutor would sign a favorable affidavit after 
Britton's testimony (Tr. at 2038-39). The date on page 2039 was 
two months after the previous contacts and refers to a date just 
prior to a federal hearing on Britton. On that date, Britton's 
attorney called the prosector's office and received assurance 
that the prosecutor would appear at Britton's hearing (Tr. at 
2039-40). Read in context, the significant facts about whether 
Britton had received a benefit for testifying are in the 
transcript. The specific dates of contact between Britton's 
attorney and the prosecutor do not appear to be significant. 
The date that Officer Valdez found the identification 
cards in the jail is not given with specificity by the officer 
himself. He was clear that the identification was found two or 
three days after February 24th (Tr. at 1602-1604). He worked the 
week of February 24; the date that he did not work was correctly 
changed to February 22 when the transcript was proofread (Tr. at 
1600 and 1604). 
The distance from which witness Larrabee saw defendant 
at Storm Mountain varied at different times because Larrabee saw 
defendant more than once (Tr. at 1198-1202). On page 1198, the 
distance is either 50 yards or 20 yards; in any event, Larrabee 
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used the courtroom as a reference and indicated that the distance 
was about twice the length of the courtroom (Tr. at 1198). This 
gave the jury a better frame of reference for the distance than 
the number of yards. The date on which a composite drawing was 
done (Tr. at 1703) can be corrected by reference to the testimony 
given by Larrabee. He testified that he assisted in the 
composite on Wednesday afternoon after Maureen Hunsaker's body 
was found (Tr. at 1205). Wednesday was February 26, the number 
to which the reporter corrected the transcript (Tr. at 1703 and 
R. at 356). 
The date on page 1875 cannot be February 20. The 
officer's testimony is that he spoke with defendant about his 
whereabouts on Sunday, February 23; obviously, this conversation 
could not have taken place on February 20 (Tr. at 1875-76). The 
interview occurred before a search warrant was executed on 
defendant's apartment; the execution of the warrant occurred at 
11:45 p.m. on February 28, 1988 (Tr. at 1875 and R. at 359). The 
approximate location of where defendant claims to have picked up 
a hitchhiker and where they supposedly became mired do not appear 
to be significant to the issues defendant has indicated he will 
raise on appeal (Br. of App. at Addendum M). The stipulation to 
the time of booking can be corrected by reference to the booking 
sheet which was being used at the time of the stipulation (Tr. at 
1888-89). As Ms. Palacios pointed out to the court, the time 
given was the booking time, not necessarily the time that booking 
was completed (Tr. at 1889). Since the time does not necessarily 
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demonstrate the completion of booking, the thirty minute 
difference between the note reader's time and the reporter's does 
not "demonstrate that Mr. Menzies did not have time to secrete 
the identification cards later found in jail laundry" (Br. of 
App. at 40). The discrepancy, even if it could not be corrected, 
is not significant. The reference to page 2620 for a question of 
how much money was missing is a reference to the State's closing 
argument, not to evidence. The discrepancy is between whether 
the prosecutor said it was "between $115 and $116 missing" or 
"between $114 and $116 missing" (Tr. at 2620). There is no 
significance in that discrepancy in the closing argument of 
counsel. 
In the penalty phase, Dr. Winkelman was listing the 
agencies with which he had worked in order to become an expert in 
his field (Tr. at 2956-65). Logic indicates that he would 
probably have worked with 100 people in a pilot project; however, 
whether it was one person or one hundred is not significant in 
the context of the testimony establishing his credentials. As to 
testimony of defendant's IQ percentile, the witness testified 
that defendant was functioning "in the average range of 
intellectual functioning" (Tr. at 3035). Obviously, that 
percentile would be "50th." The other percentiles were for 
comparative purposes and they have little, if any, significance 
for appellate review. 
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The claim about "unintelligible" arguments by counsel 
during the discussion about Britton's testimony has been 
addressed previously. 
All of the citations to the reporter's alleged 
inability to read her notes can be read in the context in which 
they are found (Br. of App. at 41). The meaning of the words and 
symbols become clear when read with the rest of the testimony. 
The "second diagnosis" on page 3079 comes from an exhibit which 
defendant introduced into evidence (Tr. at 3079 and 3105). 
Whatever the diagnosis was, it is in evidence as an exhibit; the 
testimony on page 3079 only goes to Dr. DeCaria's opinion based 
on the diagnoses given in the exhibit. His opinion is the 
significant material, not what he said the second diagnosis was. 
The court's record indicates that all witnesses were 
sworn; the fact that the transcript does not name which witnesses 
were sworn at the time that the exclusionary rule was invoked is 
not significant. The court clerk noted that the witnesses were 
sworn and either testified or did not (R. at 802-803). There is 
no indication that any witness testified without being sworn. 
POINT IV 
THIS TRANSCRIPT IS ADEQUATE FOR APPELLATE 
REVIEW; CONSEQUENTLY, THERE HAS BEEN NO 
VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS. 
Points IV, V, VI, and VII of defendant's brief allege 
that use of the transcript of his trial is a violation of various 
federal and state constitutional rights. 
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A. There is No Violation of the Federal Constitution. 
As noted above, the federal constitution requires a 
record of "'sufficient completeness' to permit proper 
consideration of [defendant's] claims." Mayer v. Chicago, 404 
U.S. at 194 (quoting Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 499 
(1963)). If the record meets that test, it does not violate any 
of the provisions of the federal constitution. As has been 
argued with specificity previously in the brief, this transcript 
is sufficient to allow review of defendant's claims. Defendant 
has not shown that this record is inadequate; consequently, he 
has not demonstrated any violation of his federal constitutional 
rights. 
B. Defendant Has Not Provided Analysis for a Different 
Construction of the State Constitution. 
Defendant also claims that the use of this transcript 
violates his rights under the Utah Constitution. He does not 
indicate what standard of transcript adequacy that this court 
should apply under the state constitution which would be 
different than the standard under the federal constitution. He 
simply states that this Court has previously noted that the Utah 
Constitution may provide different protection than its federal 
counterpart. This allegation is an insufficient basis upon which 
to create, out of whole cloth, protections which defendant fails 
to define. Because defendant has failed to analyze a different 
standard under the state constitution, this Court should decline 
to conduct state constitutional analysis. State v. Laffertv, 749 
P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988). While the case of State v. 
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Jonas, 793 P.2d 902 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), is not controlling in 
this Court, it is a case in which the court of appeals addressed 
a similar issue. In that case, the court held that a transcript 
prepared by a substitute reporter from the notes of an absent 
reporter did not deprive Jonas of rights under the Utah 
Constitution, JEci. at 910 and n. 9. The transcript in the present 
case is adequate for appellate review under both constitutions. 
POINT V 
THE STATE HAS ALREADY STIPULATED TO REMOVAL 
OF CERTAIN OF THE PROSECUTOR'S STATEMENTS; NO 
APPELLATE REVIEW OF THIS ISSUE IS REQUIRED. 
Defendant's final point refers to a statement by one of 
the prosecutors which he asked the reporter to take down on May 
16, 19 88, nearly two months after defendant was sentenced (Tr. at 
3273-75). The State stipulated on December 18, 1989, that the 
comments would be stricken (Def. Exh. #33). The comments are now 
excluded and do not violate defendant's rights; they would no 
longer be in the record but for defendant's insistence that they 
remain in the record for his own purposes (Def. Exh. #33). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm the trial court's determination that the 
record is adequate for appellate review. 
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